The Cathedral at Twenty-Five:
Citations and Impressions* James E. Kriert and Stewart J. Schwab"
It was twenty-five years ago that Guido Calabresi and Douglas Melamed published their article on property rules, liability rules, and inalienability' Calabresi, then a law professor, later a dean, is now a federal judge. Melamed, formerly a student of Calabresi's, is now a seasoned Washington attorney. Their article-which, thanks to its subtitle, we shall call The Cathedral-has had a remarkable influence on our own thinking, as we tried to show in a recent paper 2 This is not the place to rehash what we said then, but a summary might be in order. First, we demonstrated that the conventional wisdom about liability (damage) rules, that judges should use them when transaction costs are high, is incorrect, because the costs of assessing damages might in fact be higher still; if they are, property (injunction) rules are superio; at least from the standpoint of efficiency Second, and relatedly, we identified problems of correlation and synergy that come into play as one tries to choose between damages and injunctive relief. Correlation problems arise because the same considerations that yield high transaction costs usually yield high assessment costs as well; synergy problems arise because the use of damage rules can inhibit the development of more effective bargaining practices. Third, we showed that Calabresi and Melamed's celebrated Rule 4 (reverse damages) contains a paradox, which we went on to resolve by inventing reverse-reverse damages (the "double reverse twist"). The trick of the double reverse twist relates to our fourth point, having to do with a "best-chooser axiom" which can be used to illuminate matters of institutional (not just judicial) design generally Finally, we suggested in conclusion the relationship of much of the foregoing to relevant literature in other disciplines.
For now, we have nothing to add to these thoughts of ours, so we turn to the influence of Calabresi and Melamed on others. The Cathedral is undoubtedly a classic, as the occasion for this Essay suggests. But how so?
I. CITATION ANALYSIS Our inquiry relies in part on "citation analysis," a term of art. The purpose of this art is to determine the influence of particular scholars or scholarly products on the minds of others writing in a field; the practice of the art depends on the fact that researchers make reference in their publications to work by predecessors, thereby generating citations that can be collected, counted, and otherwise analyzed. What links practice to purpose (arguably a weak link, for reasons to be considered) is the notion that the material cited by the researchers "in their own papers represents a roughly valid indicator of influence on their work," 3 such that citations can be taken as an indication of the "quality or impact" of scholarly contributions, among other things.' Frequency of citation (as opposed to, say, place of citation or nature of citation) is generally the key, and quality or impact is taken to vary directly with it, in both absolute and relative terms. Basically, it is good to be cited a lot, or at least a lot more than others.
Citation analysis is most widely practiced in scientific communities, including both the hard and the social sciences. It is far less common as a measure of scholarly influence in the legal world, yet it is in connection with law (though not academic writing in law) that it originated about a century ago. We have learned this and much else from the work of Fred Shapiro, a librarian and lecturer at the Yale Law School and the only person who has demonstrated a sustained interest in modem citation studies of legal scholarship. His periodic reports, which continue to date, 5 provide a good primer on the subject, as does Richard Posner's recent study of Benjamin Cardozo. 6 As already suggested, the crucial assumption of citation analysis is "that the number of times a scholarly work is cited is a proxy for the influence or importance of the work." 7 Sometimes, however; it is not, as a few examples suggest. Survey articles are regularly cited but they are usually derivative, convenient as opposed to important. In contrast, very important works are vulnerable to "obliteration," their contributions becoming so much a part of the common understanding in a field that citations become superfluous and would even look silly.' Moreover recent publications might rack up higher citation counts than older ones because the new work is more accessible or otherwise salient; on the other hand, youth is a disadvantage when total citations over the years are being tabulated. Famous scholars might be overcited, out of deference or because they and their work come most readily to mind. Some authors who publish a lot publish a lot of junk, yet they could enjoy high counts because their work is routinely criticized. Relatedly, prolific scholars given to citing themselves can become legends in their own footnotes. This is not a complete catalog of the vices of citation analysis, but it is suggestive, sufficient, and less damning than might at first appear Regarding obliteration, for example, Shapiro rightly says, "[A]ny work so successful as to achieve this status would have already amassed a [sic] impressive citation total before becoming 'obliterated,' and would still rank near the top of the list." 9 As to critical citations, we agree with Posner that "[n]egligible work is more likely to be ignored than to be criticized in print; and work that is heavily criticized, even work decisively shown to be erroneous, plays a vital role in the growth of knowledge."'° And perhaps prolificacy should be its own reward, for it might be the only reward.
"Citation rates are as good a measure for influence," says Arthur Jacobson, "as suicide rates are for anomie, though both citation and suicide have personal sides to them as well."" Citation analysis is understood to be an imperfect proxy, but usually there is no superior (or equally wieldy) alternative. Empirical studies demonstrate a high correlation between citation counts and peer judgments, 2 and our assessment of The Cathedral relies (eventually) on more than mere numbers in any event. Whatever the state of the art, our concern is the status of the article.
II. CITATIONS TO THE CATHEDRAL
But we begin with mere numbers, some of them borrowed, with thanks, from Fred Shapiro's compilations of the most-cited law review articles, 4 The original looked back only to articles published since 1947, lacked data from some relevant publications, and limited its mostcited list to the top fifty. The update, on the other hand, has no chronological restrictions on articles surveyed, includes interdisciplinary journals that previously had been excluded, and aims to identify "the one hundred mostcited legal articles of all time, that is, most often cited within other articles."'" Because Shapiro's full-blown tabulations are readily available, there is little point in our reproducing them in their entirety here. It is interesting, however; to look at how the top thirty articles on Shapiro's two lists (1985, 1996) changed over the eleven years between them. As can be seen in Appendix I, no general pattern emerges. Some very well-known works have suffered rather marked declines since 1985,6 others have held pretty steady, 7 and several have moved up significantly on the list.'" The Cathedral is among the latter, rising from its 1985 position in the middle of the pack to a place just shy of the top ten in the expanded 1996 list.
Shapiro's 1996 rankings are based on data from the Social Science Citation Index (SSCI). Out of curiosity, and as a check, we searched another source of citation information, the Westlaw Journals and Law Review (JLR) database. The JLR database has several advantages for our purposes. First, it is more familiar to lawyers than SSCI, which makes it easier for skeptics to replicate our searches should they wish to do so.' 9 Second, JLR is tailored to law, whereas SSCI is a huge international multidisciplinary citation index, designed to cover the most important social science journals worldwide (some 1500 periodicals covering everything from anthropology to urban planning), plus selected articles from another 2400 journals in the natural and physical 13 . See Shapiro, Most-Cited11, supra note 5, at 766-71 tbl.l ("Most-Cited Law Review Articles of All Time").
14. 19. Bear in mind that searches subsequent to ours will reveal additional hits. For example, if readers want to see how their own articles stack up in comparison to our tabulation of the top articles, they should rerun a few of the highest ranking entries on our lists to see what has happened to them since the date of our search (Jan. 11, 1997).
sciences. 20 SSCI does include a number of prominent law journals, but many others are ignored. JLR, in contrast, includes virtually all legal periodicals, though its citations in some cases go back only to 1982; this is a drawback, but also a strength in that freshness is an asset in trying to measure the recent impact (say, in the last fifteen years) of an article like The Cathedral.
Our searches of the JLR database are current up to January 11, 1997. Regarding methodology, we expressed our queries in the form "Author's Last Name" /5 "Article Title." We used this approach instead of Shapiro's-he used authors and citations-because citations are much more likely to generate unreliable results. For example, a search of "85 Harv. L. Rev. 1089" would not pick up citations to "85 Harv.L.Rev. 1089" or "85 Harv. L.R. 1089" or "85 Harvard L. Rev. 1089." Of course, with our technique, a misspelled author name or article name prevents a hit. This required that we alter our approach in some instances. An example is provided by articles, many of them citation classics, that appeared under the heading "Foreword" in the Harvard Law Review's annual Supreme Court issue. The word "Foreword" is misspelled with rather amazing regularity; apparently a lot of people think of these articles not as prefaces, so to speak, but rather as stuff pushing things "forward" (which might be so, but that does not advance one's search). We remedied the problem simply by dropping "Foreword" from our title queries. Another spelling tic affected The Cathedral directly: Its junior author's name suffered abuse at the hands of many. We remedied this problem by using "Calabresi or Melamed" in our search.
The foregoing aside, we have largely followed Shapiro's methodology, which we note has been recently criticized by Landes and Posner on a number of counts. 2 They complain about ranking individual articles rather than individual scholars, suggesting, in other words, that the impact of a scholar is of more interest than the impact of a given scholarly work. But that depends on what one is trying to figure out. Surely a student of art history would not be criticized for examining how the frescoes on the ceiling of the Sistine Chapel influenced subsequent generations of artists, even though the same student would just as surely not be criticized for examining instead the influence of all of Michelangelo's paintings (or all of his art, or all of his everything). Whether a study of a person is somehow a more worthy enterprise than a study of a work can be left aside, because each can obviously be well worth doing in any event. Besides, we were commissioned to investigate Landes and Posner also criticize citation studies that exclude books, but such an exclusion makes sense in our case because it is the comparative impact of an article, not a book, that motivates our study (and we do consider a few books later on). Finally, Landes and Posner dislike Shapiro's practice of slighting (by exclusion) articles that get the majority of their citations in nonlegal journals. Happily, this shortcoming does not apply to the work of concern to us here. ' Our independent investigation into Shapiro's results entailed taking his 1996 tabulations of most-cited articles, based on SSCI, and searching those same candidate articles in JLR to see how they fared in that alternative database. (With respect both to Shapiro and ourselves, the number of times a candidate article is referred to in a citing source is immaterial. The Cathedral, for example, has a single citation added to its score whether it is cited once or many times in a given source.) 24 Because we worked from Shapiro's list, it is possible, but unlikely, that some other articles have garnered more citations than the articles high on our list.
Appendix II sets forth our list of the 100 most-cited law review articles in JLR. Among other things, Appendix II illustrates the difference a database can make, though not in the case of The Cathedral. It is cited 542 times according to SSCI and Shapiro, but only 483 times according to JLR and us, yet this sizable difference in citation frequency makes little difference in rank order (Shapiro's number 11 versus our number 14).25 In other instances, however, the source of information matters a lot. For example, three articles do spectacularly better in our rankings than in Shapiro's; 26 four others do considerably worse in our rankings as opposed to his. 27 The range of years 22 Coase's change in standing suggests another development that has undoubtedly boosted The Cathedral over the years. The subdiscipline of law and economics, only a teenager at the time of Shapiro's 1985 list, has since continued to grow and mature. One consequence is that works in the field now appear not just in law and economics journals but also, and much more regularly than a decade ago, in conventional legal periodicals. Additionally there are of course more journals now than there were before, both interdisciplinary and legal. The Cathedral has been a beneficiary of (as well as a contributor to) the ongoing success of law and economics, and of the proliferation of legal scholarship generally The second kind of benefit washes out-it extends to all contenders seeking citations-but the first does not, because it gives a comparative advantage to scholarship in the economic analysis of law in particular Note that the advantage includes an edge suggested by our earlier comments about citation analysis: Law and economics has spawned among other things a Critical literature, and Critics are about as likely to cite an article like The Cathedral as are the economists' fellow travelers (but economists are less likely to cite Critics), and every citation counts!
The inquiry suggested by the foregoing observation is a citation analysis limited to works in law and economics. We have done such a study, although only rather casually, and present the results in Table I , which also shows citations to the same works in judicial opinions. (Frank Michelman's article and Ronald Dworkin's book are included in the table for comparative purposes.)
Looking at the left-hand side of Table I (number of citations in articles), we can see that The Cathedral is a little above the median in our sample. The big winner is a book, Richard Posner's Economic Analysis of Law. Its 2446 citations put it far ahead of the top-ranked article (by Coase) on Shapiro's 1996 list; hence it beats all other articles, law and economics or otherwise. Dworkin's book also beats every article that we or Shapiro examine, and Calabresi's book beats his article with Melamed. The right-hand side of Table  I lends some impressions about another matter, the popularity of (mostly law and economics) literature among judges writing opinions. Posner dominates would be 103 on our list if we were to continue beyond the top 100).
28. See Appendix I.
The Table I suggest that books will usually have a comparative advantage over articles in the most-cited game, presumably because books generally cover a wider range of subjects (and have indexes, which make their contents more accessible). Beyond this, works that deal concretely with a specific field or specific fields probably appeal especially to judges, whereas synthetic works are likely to be of relatively more interest to scholars. Posner's book does well on both counts because it has both characteristics: Its attention to a huge number of discrete legal topics attracts judges, and its sweeping analysis of law in terms of economics is of interest to academics of many stripes. 29 Calabresi's book, a theoretical treatment of torts, is no doubt of less value to judges than would be a more doctrinal account, and so too, in spades, for his even more theoretical and less doctrinal article with Melamed; but both works, for just these reasons, excite scholars.
As a further measure of the influence of The Cathedral, especially its changing influence over the years, we decided to compare its citation record to that of another classic article, Gerald Gunther's Foreword on equal protection. 30 The two articles were published in the same year, in sequential volumes of the same high-profile law review. As Appendix I shows, both articles made both of Shapiro's lists, with Gunther doing substantially better than Calabresi and Melamed in each instance (Gunther standing I in 1985 and 3 in 1996 as compared to Calabresi and Melamed's 22 and 11). The trend favors The Cathedral-it is ascending as Foreword moves backwards-but still Shapiro has it far behind in the rankings.
Our Appendix II tells a significantly different story, with Calabresi and Melamed nearly equal to Gunther Upon observing this, we supposed that Forewoni must have passed its peak at some time in the past, whereas The Cathedral is maintaining (or increasing) its influence on the community of legal scholars. To test that notion, we traced citations to the two articles year by year (The exercise required that we abandon JLR, which goes back only to the 1980s to count citations, in favor of the SSCI used by Shapiro, which goes back to 1956.) Figure 1 displays the results and confirms our conjecture; the paths of the two articles have crossed.
Gunther's total citations in Shapiro's 1996 list are almost twofold the count for Calabresi and Melamed, but the numbers conceal the fact that the bulk of citations to Forewod came early on. In recent years The Cathedral has garnered substantially higher annual counts, and its future looks promising. instead they have none at all!) Our investigation nevertheless indicates that Calabresi and Melamed's article figures regularly in books on subjects like Property, Torts, and Contracts, at the least. Our second conviction relates to a point discussed in Part I of this Essay: Citation analysis does indeed leave much to be desired in terms of assessing influence. To be sure, an influential work must be, among other things, wellknown, and number of citations is a pretty good proxy for notoriety in a given community Notice, though, that to be a contender in the most-cited game a publication has to have reached some salient threshold in the rank order, such as 10, or 25, or 50, or 100. Nobody cares about the top twenty-six articles, or the fifty-first best article ever written.
Posner's book is helped as ell by its
So a little luck helps, and sometimes more than marginally For example, the celebrity of a work is promoted by its originality but originality itself can be a matter of chance. One obvious instance is where we get an idea before you, but you are lucky enough to publish it before us. Another and more troubling instance is where we get an idea before you and publish it before you, but you are lucky enough to get the kudos anyway. Calabresi and Melamed have enjoyed a few such happy twists of fate. They are generally credited for identifying the relevance of high versus low transaction costs in connection with the merits of injunctive relief, yet their discussion was anticipated in a book review published prior to The Cathedral. 3 Furthermore, the so-called Rule 4 (reverse damages), widely regarded as Calabresi and Melamed's signature contribution, was simultaneously and independently discovered by the Supreme Court of Arizona. 32 This itself is well-known, so the Spur Industries court has gotten its share of the limelight. Much less wellknown is the fact that Rule 4 was plainly suggested in a law student note that appeared three years prior to The Cathedral and the decision in Spur Industries. 33 Other considerations also affect how scholarly work fares in the world of citation counts. As already suggested, much turns on when citation analysts do their investigations, where they look, and how far back (these again are more or less fortuitous). It can also matter what other scholars happen to be writing at any given time, because their work can add to or detract from the significance of work by others. The display of data can make a difference; trends in rates, for example, tell a different story than do rates in isolation. Factors like these have affected the status of Calabresi and Melamed's article, usually for the better, although they have of course had a bearing on the success of other much-cited articles as well.
Is there any way, besides mere counting, to gauge conveniently The Cathedrals influence on other scholars? Consider a final exercise that relies We should mention, by the way, that it is possible that Calabresi and Melamed have in their ownt turn been denied the credit they deserve for originating other ideas that instead have been attributed to other people. See Guido Calabresi, Remarks: The Simple irtues of The Cathedral, 106 YALE LU. 2201 (1997).
in some respects on the objective methods of citation analysis but in other respects on our own subjective judgments. Taking the 483 articles that JLR identifies as citing The Cathedral, we examined them in terms of their nature; our aim was to see how Calabresi and Melamed's work has been put to use, as opposed to just how much it has been cited. We grouped citations in terms of the following four types:
Type 0: Minimal to trivial. Examples: Citing to The Cathedral for a general discussion of "transaction costs," a term not invented by Calabresi and Melamed; or citing to The Cathedral as an example of Calabresi's work, or as an example of a work in law and economics.
Type 1: Minor. Example: Citing to The Cathedral for a discussion of "property rules" and "liability rules," which are terms invented by Calabresi and Melamed.
Type 2: Substantial but somewhat derivative. Example: Citing to and discussing The Cathedral in connection with an analysis of a legal field or a legal problem in the terms that Calabresi and Melamed used to examine, for instance, the law of nuisance.
Type 3: Major. Example: Citing to and discussing The Cathedral in connection with work that significantly extends or critiques Calabresi and Melamed's ideas. Table II summarizes the results of our investigation.
It is worth noting that the very feature that made assembly of Table II manageable-it concerns itself with citations to a single work-serves to limit its value as well, because it does not permit of comparisons with other works. We consider it illuminating nonetheless. Our guess is that the extraordinarily large proportion of Type 0 and Type 1 citations is fairly typical of most-cited articles. It stands to reason that the standard use of any piece of scholarship, even (or especially) a very substantial and challenging piece like The Cathedral, will be more or less limited and conventional, because most legal writing is itself limited and conventional. Academic legal writing, moreover, appears to us to be much more idiosyncratic than academic writing in many other disciplines; legal scholars seem peculiarly inclined to go off on their own, perhaps with a nod to what inspired them (impelled by the common law tradition of citing precedents), than to engage seriously the work of others as part of an ongoing enterprise. The result is a proliferation of what might be called the "empty citations" of Type 0 and Type 1, many of which probably owe not to actual careful readings of the items cited but rather just to a practice of noting stock works that everybody seems to cite. 4 We would also expect a lot of Type 1 (and Type 2) citations to scholarship that invents a new taxonomy or framework that has applications to many different legal fields, and The Cathedral is a powerful example of such work. In this respect, Calabresi and Melamed's "property rules" and "liability Yale Law Journal. Speaking of these, Ely said that the one receiving the fewer citations -is by far the more important contribution. Unfortunately, no evidence exists that anyone has read it. (True, it gets mentioned, but generally in string citations supporting the proposition that questions of motivation are complicated and have spawned some literature.)"' Shapiro, The Most-Cited Articles fiom the Yale Law Journal, supra note 5, at 1473 (quoting John Hart Ely). Table II excludes articles in the present symposium, as well as several pre-1981 articles and a handful of post-1996 works in progress that were sent to us, mostly unsolicited, by their authors; these in particular show the remarkable influence of their progenitor even as it celebrates its silver anniversary All of this scholarship, old and new, we leave unnamed. Oversights could cause unintended offense, and we mean in any event to give more attention here to The Cathedral than to all that stand in its shadow. Suffice it to say, the Type 3 articles we have found promise to make further significant inroads on the territory first opened up by Calabresi and Melamed, who have the wonderful satisfaction of being the proximate cause of a vital body of scholarship.
YEAR
The Cathedral was not, of course, erected in a vacuum; it too is a Type 3 article that was provoked by the work of others. Here an irony enters, and we shall end with it. In the context considered by Calabresi and Melamed-the context, particularly, of litigation-transaction costs are hardly ever low; they are high either because there are many parties to a lawsuit (high coordination costs) or high because there are few (high costs of strategic bargaining). Given this, Posner's statement implies that property rights, and property rules, are seldom the best approach to disputes over resources; liability rules and centralized judicial decisionmaking should be relied upon instead. The trouble is that liability rules and centralized judicial decisionmaking are themselves costly to employ, thanks to what we elsewhere refer to as assessment costs." The issue in choosing between property rules and liability rules-between, that is, the decentralized means of the market or the centralized means of the state-is not whether transaction costs are low or high, but rather whether they are lower or higher than the assessment costs that must otherwise be expended. This is a very difficult question to resolve, which perhaps is why virtually the entire scholarly community reads Calabresi and Melamed in the convenient way that Posner suggests. Whatever the cause, the consequence is plain: Conventional thinkers opt for liability rules when voluntary exchange in the market would be costly, notwithstanding that involuntary exchange in the courts might be more costly yet. In short, The Cathedral's congregation takes on faith a proposition that the article's reasoning cannot support. 
